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Abstract. The present article is divided into two parts. Its theoretical introduc-
tory part takes under scrutiny how proper name has been previously dealt with 
in linguistics, philosophy and semiotics. The purpose of this short overview is to 
synthesise different approaches that could be productive in the semiotic analysis 
of naming practices. Author proposes that proper names should not be seen as 
a linguistic element or a type of (indexical) signs, but rather as a function that 
can be carried by different linguistic units. This approach allows us to develop 
a transdisciplinary basis for a wider understanding of naming as a sociocultural 
practice. The empirical part of the article uses one certain village in Estonia in 
Lääne-Virumaa district as an example to demonstrate how toponyms structure 
the social space, how they carry the memory and how naming practice highlights 
such changes in the semiotic behaviour of the social life that otherwise could have 
remained hidden.
Naming is one of the most important problems and research ques-
tions in semiotics, containing also the core questions of the history of 
semio tics. To name a few: the problem of name and object; the relation 
between general and particular signification; rhetorical usage of the 
name etc.
In contemporary semiotics naming can be considered a field of 
study that combines sociosemiotics and cultural semiotics and unites 
the semiotic method of study with other disciplines devoted to culture 
and society. Naming is definitely one of the most important topics in 
studying the semiotic reality. Still, we have to agree with Vilmos Voigt’s 
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comment, that “Good definitions or detailed descriptions are absent 
from semiotics handbooks” (Voigt 2007: 38).
We can, however, say that the overall interest in proper name and 
naming in general has increased in recent decades. We may speak 
about a whole wave of anthropological name research, mainly cogni-
tive stu dies of naming (for example, Cohen, Faulkner 1986; Valentine 
et al. 1996; Hollis, Valentine 2001) but most overviews still present the 
philosophical and logical tradition concentrating on the questions of 
reference and truth value as if it were the general name theory (for 
example, Hansack 1990; Lycan 1999).
This article is not aiming to fulfil the gap that Vilmos Voigt referred 
to. Emanating from the pragmatics of name I will try to present some 
possibilities that the naming research can offer for understanding the 
processes in culture and society. Theoretical studies will be illustrated 
with how the naming of the social space in my home village reflects the 
changes in the society; how the actual and institutional spatial order is 
related to that preserved in the collective memory. 
To begin with, it can be stated that compared to linguistics that deals 
with the morphological aspects of proper names, the description of the 
adequate models and the classifications of proper names (see also the 
new possibilities of classification offered by Van Langendonck 2007), 
the main interests of the philosophy of language and semiotics is nam-
ing as a process, or nomination. 
Proper name as an identifying nomination in 
linguistics and the philosophy of language
In the philosophy of language in general we can detect periods when 
theories of name prevail, and periods when theories of predicate pre-
vail. More generally we can also refer to a similar change of prevailing 
ideas in description of cultures: nowadays interest in naming is a kind 
of equilibrium to studies of culture as narrative. In other words, we 
think about name in the categories of the space, but predicate in the 
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categories of durance, timing (see Stepanov 2010: 23). At the same time 
the strategies of naming and their changes and stratifications have a 
temporal dimension, and thereby enable to seize the semiotic processes 
in the society. 
As we all know, viewing from within the system of language, proper 
name is the kind of name that names the unique, individual entity. 
Thus, it belongs to the identifying names, and carries an identifying 
meaning. In order to exemplify the identifying meaning of naming, 
it is useful to refer to the works on nomination by a Russian linguist 
and semiotician Nina Arutyunova, according to whom the identi -
fying meaning is closely related to the reference, the object outside the 
language; the derivational nature of meaning; the certainty of reference 
or extensional and the uncertainty of thought or intensional; the social 
nature of the semantic rules of use; the heterogeneity of the meaning 
(made up of the data of senses; emotional, aesthetic, and evaluative sym-
bolic associations). Competence with regard to the identifying names is 
grounded on knowing their reference. Arutyunova has written: 
Linguistic competence with regard to names that relate to the world is diffe-
rent, in principle, from words that pertain to human thinking, their system of 
concepts. In order to operate with names that lead the addressee to the objects 
of reality, one must know how to find one’s bearing in the world; in order to 
operate with semantic predicates (attributive words), one must find one’s bea-
ring among the ways of thinking about the world. In the first case, one must 
be familiar with reality, in the second case — with the expressed system of 
linguistic concepts. In the first case one must know the word’s relation to the 
object, in the second case — understand the word’s meaning. The usage of 
concrete names is determined by the ontology of the world, but the usage of 
semantic predicates — gnoseologically. (Arutyunova 1998: 24)
Here we arrive at one of the most discussed issues of the name theoreti-
cians: what separates the proper name from the general name, where to 
draw the line between the two?
Does a proper name have a meaning or do they only have a direct 
reference and how do they fulfil their reference? Equally important is 
how broad is the notion of proper name, since on this depend also the 
answers to the above-mentioned questions. Although these questions 
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lead back to Plato, more often authors start their discussions from John 
S. Mill and his work System of Logic (Mill 1973). In more recent stu-
dies, the typical illustrative model used is the semantic triangle, which 
relates the object, the sign (name) and the meaning (relation between 
linguistics — extralinguistics — logics). It does not matter how diffe-
rent concepts and notions are used for defining the object (referent) and 
meaning in the linguistic, logical, philosophical and semiotic papers. It 
is still quite clear that proper name that signifies a unique, autonomous 
entity, be it the individual or a certain segment of the world around 
him/her, is not comparable to the general name taken into account in 
the semantic meaning — in order for a general name to become a proper 
name, it must forget its semantic meaning. 
We can find a split between the proper names and the general names 
also in the language theory of Ferdinand de Saussure as he states that 
in the language more generally correlation creates a fact, thus the ono-
mastic seme cannot be subjected to the general rules of creating a sign. 
It is true that Saussure stresses rather the unchangeable entity of the 
onomastic sign: 
Whenever langue is discussed, word and meaning (or sign and meaning) make 
an appearance as if this sums up everything, but there are moreover always 
examples of words like tree, stone, cow, like Adam giving…, in other words 
what is crudest in semiology: where (through the random selection of objects 
cited) semiology is reduced to an onimic, in other words, for this is what is 
distinctive about onimics within semiology as a whole, where psychological 
association of the seme undeniably features a third element, namely, an aware-
ness that this seme refers to something external which is sufficiently defined in 
itself to elude the general law of the sign. (Saussure 2006: 70–71)
Vladimir Toporov, an author of the Tartu–Moscow School, considers 
the system of proper names and its structural research possible after 
the exact definition of the toponomastic sign (Toporov 1962: 7), which 
he studies not in the framework of language but that of the text (text 
can also be a culture, or a subsystem of culture). Proper names create a 
rather independent, untranslatable subsystem in a language that does 
not follow the rules of syntactic order. The linguistic context is not the 
primary context for the proper names; they belong to another system 
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primarily (names of individuals, street names etc). In structural lin-
guistics the question whether proper names form a separate subsystem 
within a language becomes an important problem. If the answer is yes, 
then they can be studied also with structural methods. 
Taken from that perspective, as the most important fact for the 
proper name is not the meaning but meaningfulness (in the sense of 
Hjelmslev), the proper name as a sign can be characterized purely nega-
tively as a regular sign of language (Toporov 1962).
I will bring one example from the Soviet times. When the kolkhozes 
were established in Estonia, they were given ideologically loaded names. 
An administrative division was set up, the names marking it created a 
new map placed upon the traditional toponyms. These new names (such 
as Future, Red flag, Energy, Road to Communism) were mostly associa-
ted with the ideology that they metonymically marked, and did not 
function as real toponyms. After a certain period of time the semantic 
meaning vanished and for example Future became a usual place name. 
When someone said he was going to the Future it did not create a comic 
effect anymore. After regaining the independence, when the Soviet life 
was reorganized and kolkhozes were closed down, the semantic mea-
ning of the Soviet names became evident again. For some time parallel 
toponyms were used, and both were ideologically significant.
On the possibility of transdiscplinary name theory 
This example with kolkhoz names helps to highlight two more impor-
tant theoretical aspects in addition to the above-mentioned.
Proper name is a situative sign, the motivation of which is social and 
historical. Hence the functional resemblance of proper names to deictic 
names, mostly indicative pronouns.
First, the boundaries of proper name and general name are not easy 
to set; the most interesting research area for semiotics is the transfor-
mation from proper to general name and vice versa in actual speech 
situation. The latter should be seen here as a sociocultural situation. 
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Secondly, taking Arutyunova’s condensed comparison (Arutyunova 
1998: 2) as a basis for the semantic possibilities of an identifying name 
(deictics, proper names and general names), to mark an immediate or 
mediated object in the field of perception can be described as the fol-
lowing.
(1) The choice of deictic words depends on the concrete speech act. 
They can be seen as moving definers that can be applied to whatever 
referent. Their meaning is completely defined by the attributes of the 
denotate.
(2) Proper names have a unique reference, their content is set by the 
qualities of the denotate. Though independent of the conditions of the 
communication, they depend on social practice and changing naming 
strategies in general. Like deictics, they are still semantically deficient. 
This is related to an aspect in logic that none of the predicates can create 
an analytical statement with a proper name the truth-value of which is 
guaranteed by the truth–value of the words within this sentence. 
(3) General names have a complete semantic structure — a con-
cept (designate, Sinn), that is made up of the general attributes of this 
class and concrete — individual content that is created in the speech 
act through the denotate, the attributes of the referent. Meaning that 
describes certain attributes is the skeleton of the general name assu ring 
its stability, while the denotative meaning varies during the usage. 
In order to describe the proper name one might add that they can-
not be taxonomically put into order, the basis of their classification is 
extralinguistic. At the same time, paradoxically these extralinguistic 
systems ascribe to proper names certain meanings, or connotations. 
Philosophy of language is more inclined to deal with the intentional 
content of the name, also with the problem of correlation between 
identifying inva riant reference and individual name usage. Hence the 
questions that in phenomenology touch upon the perceptive processes 
of the material world itself. We can draw a parallel between the concept 
of descriptive cluster in Searle’s proper name theory (Searle 1958; 1983) 
and Husserl’s concept of the transcendentality of the object: a unified 
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world of perception, which enables the object to remain self-identical in 
this plurality of given entities (Husserl 1998: 55–79). 
Thus, when we analyze the proper name not so much as an element 
of the linguistic system, but as an individualizing function, we may state 
that the function of the proper name (signifying an individual object) 
may be carried out depending on pragmatics of a given discourse: either 
the deictics that have received an identifying meaning within a certain 
enunciation; or the general names the semantic meaning of which is 
more stable and context independent. 
At the same time traditional proper names (Eigentliche Eigenname 
in the sense of Gottlob Frege) are sort of a gap that comprises the pro-
perties of deictics but also the possibilities to become a spoken general 
name — due to the overwhelming domination of predicative meaning 
over the identifying meaning. Thus, proper names have different func-
tional possibilities and the function of the proper name can be carried 
out by different names. 
This viewpoint can be compared to Ch. S. Peirce’s understanding 
of proper name. He places proper name in his classifications of rela-
tions between the sign and object under indices, in the wider context 
of referential signs. 
An indexical word, such as a proper noun or demonstrative or selective pro-
noun, has force to draw the attention of the listener to some hecceity common 
to the experience of speaker and listener. By a hecceity, I mean, some element 
of existence which, not merely by the likeness between its different appari-
tions, but by an inward force of identity, manifesting itself in the continuity of 
its apparition throughout time and in space, is distinct from everything else, 
and is thus fit (as it can in no other way be) to receive a proper name or to be 
indicated as this or that. (CP: 2.434)
Everything that focuses attention to itself can be viewed as an index. 
The names of persons and places are signs due to their relation with 
their objects in the same way that are personal and referential pronouns, 
letters in a scheme or knock on the door. Real index and its objects 
have to be individual objects. At the same time indexicality is a part 
of semiosis, the process of transmutation of the proper name as a sign: 
204 Ülle Pärli
A proper name, when one meets with it for the first time, is existentially con-
nected with some perception or other equivalent individual knowledge of the 
individual it names. It is then, and then only, a genuine Index. The next time 
one meets with it, one regards it as an Icon of that Index. The habitual acquain-
tance with it having been acquired, it becomes a Symbol whose Interpretant 
represents it as an Icon of an Index of the Individual named. (CP: 2.329)
The movement in this case is only in one direction; from the identifying 
name of a single object to singular concept and then to a general term, 
divided predicative meaning (here we have to take into account that 
Peirce’s notion of a proper name is wide and in English it can be any 
concrete name with a definite article the)1.
Seeing proper name as an index is also close to the understanding 
of Bertrand Russell (Russell 1940) the real logical proper name is the 
indica tive pronoun this, or the idea of Michel Foucault that the proper 
name enables to point a finger at something, and therefore to transfer 
unnoticeably from the area of speaking to the area of watching. These 
spheres can be brought together as if they were adequate. On the other 
hand, the idea that the act of signifying transforms smoothly into 
an act of showing has been criticized by Claude Lévi-Strauss (1996) 
who describes the so-called savage mind as a centralized and socially 
conditioned naming system. Society sets the basic categories and cor-
relation rules of classification and generalisation, as well as the spheres 
of general and proper names and their mutual dependece. It must be 
mentioned here that the views of Lévi-Strauss have also influenced the 
Tartu–Moscow School thinkers, namely their idea of the proper name as 
the social sign, as well as their view that mythological thinking bound 
to proper names continues to be used for interpreting the world in now-
adays culture as well. 
Peirce’s concept of the proper name indicates an important point: 
analyzing the proper name we should distinguish (1) cases where 
we deal with the objects that are currently in the field of perception; 
(2) the recognition of such familiar objects or spaces of which we have 
1 See Peirce’s concept of proper name in comparison with the causal proper name 
theory (Pietarinen 2010; see also Weber 2008).
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a visual idea; and (3) objects that we can recognize and identify relying 
on our knowledge and that assure the mutual understanding with the 
partner of the dialogue, but about which we lack a personal experience, 
or contact. 
Our personally perceived-remembered world does not require 
proper names and naming as it is individual, possessive, partitive, and 
local. Also the categorical names signifying objects function here as 
proper names possessing a direct reference, which is set by a situative 
denotation. 
According to Russell real proper names this and me apply for the 
narrow here-and-now world. 
The word “this” appears to have the character of a proper name, in the sense 
that it merely designates an object without in any degree describing it. It might 
be thought to ascribe to an object the property of being present to attention, 
but this would be a mistake: many objects on many occasions are present to 
attention, but on each occasion only one is this. We may say: “this” means “the 
object “ of this act of attention; but this obviously is no definition. “This” is the 
name which we give to the object to which we are attending, but we cannot 
define “this” as the object to which I now attend, because “I” and “now” involve 
“this”. […] the designatum of “this” is continually changing. (Russell 1940: 109) 
The world of objects under my attention is socially distributed through 
the names that are independent of the communication situation. The 
perception, Vorstellung that here accompanies the proper name, can be 
to a large extent shared within the society, in contrast to the idea that 
is created by an identifying general name which is paradoxically at the 
same time more general and more individual. In a situation where the 
object named or none of the objects of the given class are empirically 
familiar, naming does not bring along a visual effect but knowledge 
about the object. 
Therefore, from one side we can state that no strict boundary can 
be drawn between the proper name and the general name. Or as the 
semiotician and linguist Juri Stepanov (1998: 187) writes: “Proper 
names (individual names) name things (and thereby can name terms 
and concepts), whereas common nouns name terms, concepts, and are 
thereby able to name things”. Still the boundary between the universal 
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and unique, marked by the proper and common name, cannot be level-
led off, due to the general essence of language. Also the experimental 
cognitive psychology that deals with the processes of remembering, 
reproducing and forgetting, proves the importance of this boundary in 
our linguistic behaviour. Proper name and general name are like two 
registries that are united in their conflict: “Discourse flows freely from 
one sphere into another but the latter do not merge. On the contrary, 
the contrast between them is merely emphasised.” (Lotman 2000: 104).
For the Tartu–Moscow Semiotic School proper names have been one 
of the research fields of cultural semiotics. This essentially myth-related 
proper name that is discussed by the authors of the Tartu–Moscow 
School, is based on the archaic perception-based naming of the world 
(compare to Cassirer 2010).
However, proper name is the carrier of the mythic conscience not 
only historically, but it also forms a mythological substrate in nowadays 
culture. 
The topic of naming has always been related to the study of the 
myth. Different authors have stressed in their various researches the 
syncretism of archaic name; in our categorizing mind the boundaries 
of proper and common names cannot be specified (see an overview in 
Pärli, Rudakovskaja 2002). The name of the God is the same as the func-
tion of God. The destiny of God depends on the destiny of the name, not 
vice versa. In the current culture, proper name preserves several ways 
of thinking that are typical of mythological thinking: the sameness of 
name and object; belief in the strength of the name; the fragmentary 
idea of the room and hierarchization created by the name; hiding the 
name; making the name a taboo, and releasing it from being a taboo; 
changing the name as a means to change the social status; using a dif-
ferent name in different situations, etc. The above-mentioned topics 
have been discussed in various works by Uspenskij, Ivanov, Lotman 
and Toporov (see also Nikolayeva 2007). The function of the name, 
its significance in a certain sociocultural context, remains the central 
question. Toponyms and personal names have usually been considered 
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under the category ‘proper name’; these are Eigentliche Eigenname (rigid 
designators) in Frege’ s sense.
At first glance it seems that this myth-based cultural semiotic theory 
cannot be related to a name theory of the logico-semantic linguistic 
analysis. Starting points are so different — myth and logic. As we know, 
the rules of logic are based on the laws of symbolization. Knowledge 
here means verbal knowledge. Analytical sayings are related not to 
reality but to language. This means that the truth-value is based on 
language, which presumes the separation of name and attributes. For 
example, for the descriptive name theory, name acquires a meaning 
through description. In other words, according to Frege Sinn is a way 
of presenting Bedeutung. Hence we can raise a question how relevant 
are certain concrete descriptions in case of an identifying claim: they 
are used in order that all the speakers could be sure that the discussion 
is about one and the same person. Or as Searle (1958: 171–173) has writ-
ten, culture validates the hierarchy of identifying descriptions. Every 
description taken separately sheds light on only one side of an object, at 
the same time pretending to identify the whole. Therefore, a multitude 
of describing properties is the source of the multitude of possible ways 
for identifying something, while in fact we lack the principle that would 
allow constructing a complete field of distinctive attributes.
Name theory based on myth does not deny the categorizing function 
of proper name, the logically equalling argument actually fulfils the 
identification of the whole through a certain attribute. We could also 
view this cluster of attributes as an assemblage of different objects. Thus, 
these approaches are not as contradictory as may seem at first glance. 
Altogether, we might ask how in the time of powerful mass media can 
we possibly distinguish to what extent descriptions define the proper 
name and to what extent certain concepts or stereotypes usurp proper 
names. We do live in the era of onomastic noise. Paradoxically ideo-
logy, advertising, and sociocultural stereotypes in a broader sense 
empty the proper names they exploit. We can talk about a strangely 
reversed type of mythological thinking created on a rational basis. The 
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archaic sameness of the part and whole becomes the impossibility of 
the whole as such. 
Example: Toponyms as structurers of 
sociocultural space and carriers of memory
As a continuation to my discussion I will offer a concrete empirical ana-
lysis of toponyms to demonstrate a possible application of name theory 
to describe specific sociocultural processes. I will employ diffe rent pos-
sible proper name functions that are realised in a certain socium.
The village — Lokosoo — of which the present study is about, is 
almost entirely absent from all maps. It is located in northern Estonia, in 
West-Viru district, Kadrina municipality, at the border of present Või-
pere and Kihlevere villages (Fig. 1). This name marks out an unclearly 
bounded region that has, in different times, connected about ten farm-
steads. It is a small settlement that has usually been situated on the lands 
of the Aaspere manor, and as the borders have changed, it has been 
partially attached to the Kihlevere manor. In a 1782 census, in which 
Figure 1. Th e location of Lokosoo village on the Estonian map.
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the Aaspere manor is for the first time described village by village, this 
particular village is absent. The name can, however, be found on an 1875 
map, but not as referring to a village, but to a bog (Lokusoo/ Lohusoo); 
there we can also find the names “Lohhuse Weld” (parish), “Lohusoo 
Mäggi” (hill). In later periods, the settlement has been divided between 
the Võipere and the Kihlevere (Kodasoo) villages, whereas the border 
of the latter has, in its own turn, marked the border of parishes. During 
the Soviet period, this border was also the border of selsoviets, and 
households situated along the border were at times part of the Aaspere, 
at times part of the Kadrina selsoviets. Even in contemporary Republic 
of Estonia, the inhabitants of this small village have had to order their 
newspapers and do transactions with the Estonian Postal Service either 
in Aaspere or in Kadrina. Accordingly, some of the farmsteads have, 
in different times, been related either with the Haljala or the Kadrina 
church. Despite all this, the people have been united by a common vil-
lage space, and since the family relations between the inhabitants were 
also close, we may treat the village as a unified whole, indicated by 
the name Lokusoo during the days of the Republic of Estonia and the 
Soviet Union. However, in the consciousness and parlance of today’s 
new inhabitants, this name is no longer widespread.
In the following, I will discuss place names that designate a village 
and its surrounding landscapes. Some of these names may be institu-
tionalised, some, however, are in use only within the village itself, and it 
is precisely these names that internally structure the village. Non-insti-
tutionalised, local names are like a cipher, only known to the devotees 
accepted into their language game by the village community. These 
names in their own turn are able to generate “shared” visual imagery.
Persons and place names
For a place name to identify a particular location, there must exist a 
historical relationship between the name and its user — a knowledge or 
experienced familiarity that creates a sense of landscape as interpreted 
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text. If, for example, a predication related to a person’s name has as 
a rule a narrative structure, like an event, “the one who is/ has been 
doing …”, then in the case of place names the predication is nomina-
tive, descriptive. However, in the present analysis the personal and place 
names are inseparable, since the spatial order of the village is social by 
its nature. For example, we can discern the following uses of personal 
names as place names: owner’s name as a place name or farm’s name 
that also designates the owner and the whole family. For those who 
remember the old names, a new dweller with whom he/ she has no con-
tact may be nameless, or named as the “One who lives in the house of 
Otu Hans”, at the same time, for the one not remembering older names, 
the house of Otu Hans can be “the house where Epp lives”. 
The above-mentioned examples also give evidence that the place 
names to be examined are inseparably connected to categorical nouns 
that signify elements of the village landscape (farmstead, road, meadow), 
and concurrently structure the system of proper names taxonomically, 
or, in other words, these are names that simultaneously distinguish and 
categorise. Genitive syntagmatic structures have indeed been used, that 
essentially express a relationship of belonging, possession (who has, who 
owns), while at the same time functioning as inseparable syntactic cons-
tructions as compound nouns. The complexity of names is associated 
with the dual nature of what the names indicate. For example, “Peeter’s 
road” indicates one part of a farmstead considered as a spatial whole, 
as well as one of several village roads that constitute a network of roads 
that connects a set of farmsteads. It is interesting that in such name 
pairs proper names can perform signification, can render meaning and 
integration (“Peeter’s” as a situative common noun that converges the 
objects belonging to that farmstead), whereas the common nouns (road, 
bog) can function as situative proper names as singular objects that 
belong to Peter’s farmstead. Yet we can also take an entirely opposite 
view: for example, that a bog is divided into Kangro’s and Peeter’s bogs.
Thus, since the toponyms that identify the village landscape are pri-
marily derived from the names of the inhabitants for the purpose of 
marking out their land ownership, the rearrangement and restructuring 
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of the village landscape during societal changes is expressed in the place 
names that were/ are in use. The liaison of place and personal names 
has likewise been changing in time. Furthermore, as we will see later 
on, names live their own lives, carrying memories of those structures 
that have been destroyed by social cataclysms or that have undergone 
changes over time during the village’s development. The simultaneous 
use of names that have come into use at different times preserves the 
past in memory, and at the same time unites the present and the past, 
the current reality and remembered reality into an atemporal whole.
Saul Kripke says: 
When I say that a designator is rigid, and designates the same thing in all pos-
sible worlds, I mean that, as used in our language, it stands for that thing, when 
we talk about counterfactual situations. […] It is in this sense that I speak of 
a rigid designator [a proper name — Ü.P.] as having the same reference in all 
possible worlds. (Kripke 1980: 77–78)
What he means is that the name rigidly refers to that one thing. Simi-
larly, a place name that is used in a village society can function as a 
rigid denominator in parallel remembered realities. Indeed, the use 
of the names of farmsteads does in fact indicate the reality, which for 
the Soviet era is what could have been, and that continues to exist and 
becomes marked as a “possible existence” by way of names. While 
Kripke, who primarily discusses personal names for expounding his 
views, argues that “it’s in virtue of our connection with other speakers 
in the community, going back to the referent himself, that we refer to a 
certain man” (Kripke 1980: 94), we can argue the same about the chain 
of communication that connects a particular object to a place name. It 
is especially the non-institutionalised proper names that persist as long 
as they are shared within the community or as long as their knowledge 
is passed from generation to generation. Thus we may examine the vil-
lage space as a collective body of place names.
212 Ülle Pärli
Individual farmsteads: The oldest stratum of topoyms
The oldest stratum of toponyms used in the village, even during the 
Soviet period, were indeed the old Republic of Estonia era names for 
farmsteads, and the names of fields, pastures, meadows, roads, forests 
and bogs belonging to them.
During the period of farmsteads, the entire village landscape was 
named and identified (for example, Kangro talu, Kangro road, Kangro 
meadow, Kangro forest, Kangro bog). It was the act of naming, which 
is indeed an act of delineation and thereby an act of identification and 
acknowledgment of the continuity of the object in time, that revealed 
the internal order of the village. Moving around the village landscape, 
one constantly crossed borders; it was a movement through “alien” 
places. It could be argued that such a village structure is by its nature 
based on proper names.
First of all, the familiar landscape, one’s own farmstead as a world of 
exemplary, unique places and things, where everything can be referred 
to by using the denotating pronoun “this” — the names that signify 
home (for example, house, barn, granary, paddock, pasture, well) can 
here be treated as speech-based proper names, since their reference can 
be, as Kripke expresses it, “determined ostensively” (Kripke 1980: 28). 
Here we can also refer to John Austin’s discussion that whatever words 
can in a certain situation of “our presence” be defined as proper names. 
Concurrently, as also appears from the introductory part of this article, 
we may agree with Austin if he considers false the claim that all names 
could be seen as factual proper names. Austin considers the viewpoint 
that general names have a denotate similarly to proper names as false as 
the viewpoint that proper names have a connotation similar to the gene-
ral names (Austin 1999: 313–14). In the case of our previous example of 
a farm family we are dealing with a temporarily and spatially localized 
language community which owns a common “referential space”, not 
occurring new in every moment but with a rather persistent nature that 
makes it possible to unite certain general names with a strict persistent 
reference (as a unique farmstead geography). 
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Secondly — farmstead is surrounded by similar “universes” that 
require naming (and for which we must name ourselves), since we must 
distinguish them from one another — whose village, whose pasture, 
whose road? This, too, is a world of proper names, consisting of singu-
larities that in their own turn comprise the village as an ordered space. 
There are also elements within the complete village structure that, 
designated with common nouns, operate as proper names and require 
names only for an external point of view (school, shop, parish centre).
A fascinating topic that would require a separate inquiry is the 
impact of the “Estonification”2 of surnames to toponyms. Frequently, 
members of the same family adopted different Estonian-sounding 
names, for which reason the places named after them lost their initial 
integrity, resulting in a more detailed breakdown of the village struc-
ture. An example is provided by the split in proper names within my 
own family: my grandfather and two of his brothers, who lived in close 
vicinity in the village, replaced their common surname Limann with 
three different names: Liiva, Liivaorg, Liimand. Accordingly, the farm-
steads acquired new markers, even though in the village parlance the 
old surnames or given names were used to talk about farmsteads. The 
new names had to become rooted over the course of time.
2 Fixed family names were given to Estonians in the beginning of the 19th centure. 
Before that people were called after their farmstead’s name or by their father’s and 
first name. Since the family names were given to peasants by German estate holders, 
the new given names were often German. In 1930s a campaign called “Every Esto-
nian should have an Estonian name” was carried out in order to change the German 
surnames into Estonian ones. Since 1934, Estonification of names became a state 
policy. In case of personal names, Estonification was freewilling, but in case of place 
names it became compulsory. Special models of name formation were created to be 
used for Estonification. By 1940 when the Soviet occupation started, most of the 
foreign surnames had been changed (Must 2000).
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Names and Soviet occupation
The Soviet occupation on 1940, the war and subsequent repression 
touched almost every family in the village: the owners of several farm-
steads died in the war or were sent to labour camps. Almost half of the 
families were deported to Siberia after the war and their farms were 
taken over by new unrelated people. During the first decade after the 
war, collective farms were formed following the model of Soviet Union 
and for that end, the land, animals and farming tools were nationalised.3 
Many people left the village. Those who stayed and also the new kolk-
hoz workers that had come to the village, were given a small plot of land 
(0,6 ha) for small scale gardening. On these lands potatoes and cereals 
were cultivated for people themselves and their strictly limited number 
of domestic animals. Thus a double economy was formed: one’s own 
fields and animals, and the kolkhoz’s fields and animals.
In cases where the inhabitants changed during the Soviet times, the 
old, pre-war names of farmsteads are retained alongside the names of 
the new inhabitants (for example, Põõsaste as the name for a farmstead 
and Haukka as the surname of the new inhabitants). In some houses, 
the inhabitants changed so frequently that they failed to pass on their 
own name to the place, and thus the farmstead continued to be named 
after the name of the former owner (for example, Otu Hansu). Some old 
Estonian names were in fact so potent that they provided the official 
name for the new Soviet-era buildings erected on the site of a former 
farmstead. An example is provided by one of the more developed farm-
steads in the village — Peetri — the owners of which were repressed and 
deported to Siberia. The farm building now located on its lands is even 
today called the Peetri barn, independently of the new owner.
With the formation of collective farms, the fastest to turn anony-
mous were the fields, which from then on acquired annually changing 
3 Although, we have to say that very few farms had farming machines at that time 
since most of the work was done with horses. The nationalisaton of horses was es-
pecially hard on the villagers, because horses had been a source of pride for farm 
owners.
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names based on the crops growing there. When the exact location had 
to be specified, it was done by describing it, in which the names of places 
adjoining the field could be helpful. 
The places that were less dependent on the co-operation of people 
retained their former names for longer and carried forward the his-
torical structure of the village. Thus roads retained their names that 
originated from the period of farmsteads. At one time, there was a road 
passing behind the village, connecting the farmsteads and the Aaspere 
and Kihlevere manors. Later on, a highway was constructed on the other 
side of the village, and individual roads from every farmstead led up to 
it, which accordingly acquired their names from the farmsteads. The 
former intra-village road was dug up, and in its stead there slowly devel-
oped a new road, leading from farmstead to farmstead, in parallel to the 
highway. Still during the Soviet era, when going to school for example, 
I could choose between six different roads, depending on the season, 
weather and mood: Põllukopli road, Paju road, Jaagupi road, Põõsaste 
road, Kangro road, Peetri road. The road that connected the farmsteads, 
however, had always been nameless, similar to the highway being just 
“the highway”.
The forest meadows also retained their names as derived from for-
mer farmsteads. Since the collective farm made practically no use of 
them, the village inhabitants made hay there for their animals, distrib-
uting them according to the farmstead-era borders. This did not go 
without disputes, however, when for example the relatives from differ-
ent families of repressed owners laid claim to the hayfields of former 
farmsteads. This continued until amelioration works destroyed these 
hayfields at the very end of the Soviet period. The names of farmsteads 
were nevertheless preserved even in cases when the houses had been 
abandoned and completely decayed — what was usually preserved were 
the gardens that retained the memory of those who had set them up: 
Jaagupi garden, Mäeotsa garden, Jaani garden, Sangmanni garden. By 
today, even most of these gardens have completely deteriorated, and 
only a few village inhabitants still remember their names.
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One of the Soviet-era changes was that there came into being a large-
scale and homogenous “own” space, comparable to the earlier “own” of 
the established farmsteads. Since the households of collective farmers 
were also retained, it was paradoxically as if the “own” space was dou-
bled. Pigsty, cowshed, calf shed, workshop, office, granary, grain dryer 
were, at least for the first small collective farm that was confined to this 
single village, singular places that did not require to be referred to with 
proper names. Later, as the collective farm grew, the village became but 
one of its divisions, and there appeared the necessity for naming and 
distinguishing those places that previously, in their singularity, did not 
require names (Liivari cowshed — Kihlevere cowshed; Peetri pigsty — 
Kihlevere pigsty).
During the Soviet period, small domestic households and kitchen 
gardens that are part of them are no longer adjacent to one another, they 
are like islands in the kolkhoz-space. Thus there is an anonymous zone 
between places designated with names. Moving around the village, we 
no longer cross borders as we used to, but rather move in the “common 
space” of the collective farm. The names of the village inhabitants now 
only identify buildings and kitchen gardens. Thus the village is now 
more weakly structured. Or rather, to put it more precisely, it is more 
strongly structured for those who remember the farmstead-era arrange-
ments and the place names that carried them, and much more loosely 
arranged for those who do not remember this.
Anonymisation of village space
Indeed, we could argue that over time, the village has become increas-
ingly anonymous. By today, two new houses have been built in the 
village and three have been abandoned and become deteriorated. How-
ever, inhabitants have changed in most of the houses, in some of them 
several times. With the privatisation campaign after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the lands have usually been returned to the descendants 
of the former owners, only very few of whom have any connections with 
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their former homesteads, and who may not even know each other (dur-
ing the restitution of property, part of the lands were returned to distant 
relatives of former owners, who lacked any connection with the village 
whatsoever). Almost none of them are engaged in cultivating the lands 
on their own. A large part of former fields are rented out to companies 
whose owners are not connected to the village and that own lands in 
various different locations. Property lines are known in the village, but 
this is insufficient for providing the fields with permanent names. And 
the names of the landholders are used to name the crops growing on the 
fields (Ants’ barley, Aru Group’s cole). Only very few village inhabitants 
can name both the landowner of the field and the person or group who 
cultivates it. The social make-up of the village is varied and the level of 
connectedness to the place is varies widely among the inhabitants; for 
many, it is just a place to live, be it permanently or temporarily. There is 
only one farmstead whose inhabitants are descendants of former owners 
and who are engaged in cultivating the land. Another family exists that 
settled down in the village somewhat later and is still engaged in farm 
work.
The connection of the rest with the village and with the land is 
diverse: there are landowners who live in the village either permanently 
or seasonally (the family lives elsewhere) and have rented their land to 
other landowners or farming unions; a young family working in the 
nearby town and who thus do not cultivate the land; a family where all 
the members have found work (and residence) in Tallinn and who only 
stay in their country home during their free time; people from Tal-
linn who have bought the farmstead as their summer house; a family 
on unemployment benefits who acquired a deteriorating house; senior 
citizens who have sold their city homes and moved permanently to the 
countryside; farmhands — who moreover come and go frequently — of 
a farm belonging to owners who themselves live elsewhere.
Thus we see that for many people the village is only a partially own 
place; socially, the village is an amorphous formation, and there is no 
common ground for communication. This lack of social connections 
between the village inhabitants is also expressed in name usage, in how 
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the spatial arrangement of the village landscape is fixed. On the one 
hand, earlier important mental coordinates that were able to structure 
the village space have sunk into oblivion, and on the other hand, the 
contemporary situation mostly fails to generate new ones. The chain of 
communication required for knowing the names has been severed. It 
is characteristic that not all of the villagers know other’s surnames. As 
a rule, in order to designate households, given names are used, which, 
compared to the traditional place names derived from personal names, 
specify the place somewhat more strongly based on the particular per-
sons themselves (compare name usage: the earlier “I’ll go to Kangro’s”, 
“I was at Peeter’s”, “go past Rein’s and you’ll arrive at Põõsaste”, in which 
case the names refer to farmstead, and the current “I was visiting Mati”, 
“I’m coming from Epp’s place”, “turn right from Dalja’s house”, where 
the names of the present inhabitants function as place names. By selec-
ting the name of the person who communicates the most with other 
inhabitants of the village, today’s place name no longer includes the 
family as a whole. 
Quite remarkable is the pattern that men designate neighbouring 
farmsteads according to men living there and women according to 
women living there, younger members of the village know only their 
contemporaries. The village landscape is mapped according to the peo-
ple with whom they have a personal relationship. To put it simply, one 
might say that each dweller has his/ her own personal map of the signifi-
cant objects and accordingly a name system that only partially overlaps 
with the other similar ones. 
Contemporary names fail to generate a layout of the village that 
would articulate the village in a novel manner. There is more of the 
alien, of the unknown that detaches people from one another. The isola-
tion is even expressed in the fact that most likely there is no one in the 
village who has visited all of their neighbours. Communication only 
takes place in the microworlds that may intersect at some places, or is 
missing completely in the case of certain people. As most of the dwellers 
use their cars for getting around in the village, the visual image of the 
neighbourhood is rather superficial, only a glimpse of an impression 
from a limited perspective. 
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A good example of contemporary indefiniteness has to do with 
roads. By today, only the road that passes through the village and leads 
up to the highway is still intact, all the farm roads in between have 
disappeared, ploughed up together with the fields. This solitary road 
lacks a name and its status as belonging either to the parish or part by 
part to the villagers is under dispute. In any case, no one feels respon-
sibility for keeping it in proper condition. People only take care of the 
road near their house, or behind their fences. In between the farmsteads 
are brushwood areas that actually all belong to someone. During the 
Soviet times people still took care of the whole roadside area (making 
hay, herding) and based on a silent agreement people followed the old 
borders of the farmsteads. Nowadays, when all of the borders have been 
restored, part of the land is socially undesignated and remains out of 
the care of the owners. The same applies to narrow areas of the fields. 
Paradoxically, the Soviet understanding of the narrow “personal or 
own” home territory (within one’s house and garden) concept survives 
in this attitude, and altering it takes some time. For the time being 
contemporary village will only have diffused, uncertain boundaries. 
As stated above, there are no common activities or everyday practices 
that would recreate the identifying difference, also in the sense of na-
ming and remembering. Current situation could be illustrated with an 
example from Michel de Certeau’s book The Practice of Everyday Life 
where he cites the words of a citizen of Rouen (Certeau 1988: 106): “no, 
here ‘there isn’t any place special, except for my own home, that’s all… 
There isn’t anything’”. Certeau comments: “Nothing ‘special’ — nothing 
that is marked, opened up by a memory or a story, signed by something 
or someone else” (ibid.).
In conclusion
It may be argued that the arrangement derived from the era of farm-
steads was still viable during the Soviet era, and was capable of 
restraining the processes of anonymisation of the village landscape. 
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The old personal names that are used as place names formed meto-
nymically an interwoven network of names (the name of a farmstead 
gave in its turn its name to the lands, forests and roads that were part 
of it) This synchronic system was enriched by the historical layers of 
naming that survived owing to the general social organisation of the 
village where several generations of the same family lived in the same 
place. Owing to this, the semiotic potential (the ways of identification 
or transferring the name; developments on the reference-symbol scale) 
was extremely rich.
Today, where there are very few people left in the village that still 
have these memories (my own generation is the last one that still 
remembers what they, in their turn, had heard from their parents), 
and where people are no longer connected by a similar way of life, the 
deepening anonymity of the village landscape is inevitable. A substan-
tial change in the semiotic behaviour has accompanied recent social 
changes, something that the examination of naming practices can 
reveal extremely well. Thus the personal names that are used as place 
names today maintain the reference to one singular person and their 
capacity to structure space is limited to the person’s house and its sur-
rounding garden. Shared network of names has given way to sets of 
idiosyncratically used names that only partially coincide with other 
people. This spatial fragmentation and the vagueness of the borders 
correspond to the loss of communally shared life rhythm that was pre-
viously shaped by farming activities. This tendency in its turn is related 
to the fact that the only domestic animals in the village now are modern 
pets that are being kept and called according to common urban pat-
terns; traditional village dog names disappear with the appearance of 
breed dogs. In conclusion, we can say that instead of shared village space 
and shared way of life, today’s naming practices delineate individual 
autonomous social units on one hand, and anonymous impersonal vil-
lage space on the other. The names’ capacity for social organisation is 
weakened: increasing dependence on the situation of naming and the 
relativity of the general background lend importance to the demonstra-
tive aspect of names, or alternatively create a need for demonstrative 
221Proper name as an object of semiotic research
indications. Accordingly, the capacity of names to function as symbols 
in the broader social context is curbed. The transitions from the act of 
signification and the act of naming are more loosely regulated.4 
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Имя собственное как объект семиотического исследования
Настоящая статья посвящена семиотике наименования: вводная тео-
ретическая часть дает краткий обзор основных положений теории 
имени собственного в лингвистике, философии языка, семиотике. 
Целью данного обзора является поиск возможностей синтеза разных 
точек зрения для создания основ системного семиотического описания 
наименовния. При этом автор статьи исходит из понимания имени 
собственного не столько как элемента языка, индексиального знака, 
сколько языковой функции, которую могут выполнять в зависимо-
сти от контекста разные языковые средства. Именно такое понимание 
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имени собственного создает предпосылки для более широкого осмыс-
ления наименования как социокультурной практики.
Исследовательская часть работы иллюстрирует на примере одной 
конкретной эстонской деревни как наименования структурируют 
социальное пространство, сохраняют память о прошлом, делают 
явными изменения в семиотическом поведений жителей. 
Pärisnimi semiootilise uurimuse objektina
Käesolev artikkel vaatleb oma sissejuhatavas osas pärisnime käsitlemist 
keeleteaduses ja filosoofias ning semiootikas. Selle lühikese ülevaate eesmär-
giks on sünteesida seisukohti, mis võiksid olla produktiivsed nimetamise 
praktikate semiootiliseks mõtestamiseks. Autori arvates tulekski pärisnime 
vaadelda mitte niivõrd keeleelemendi või (indeksiaalse) märgitüübina, 
kui võrd funktsioonina, mida võivad kanda erinevad keeleühikud. Selline 
vaatlus võimaldab kujundada transdistsiplinaarsed alused nimetamise kui 
sotsiokultuurilise praktika laiemale mõtestamisele. 
Artikli uurimuslik osa demonstreerib konkreetse Lääne-Virumaa küla 
näitel, kuidas toponüümid struktureerivad sotsiaalset ruumi, kannavad 
mälu, kuidas nimetamispraktika teeb nähtavaks need ühiskondlikus elus aset 
leidvad semiootilise käitumise muutused, mis muidu jääksid ehk varjatuks. 
